Why post this now?
I first “surfed” the World Wide Web in June, 1994, at Microsoft. One of my co-workers had an “Internet Tap” in his office: a standard RJ45 wall plate, connected directly to the Internet (rather than the internal corporate network). This was before “firewalls”, so there were many cautions to be followed! I ordered an internet tap for my office, and started exploring the WWW at a blazing 1 Mbps (14.4 K was the fastest dial-up modem speed at the time).
In The Beginning
In early October, my manager John Ludwig asked me to assemble a team and build a web browser for “Chicago” (the code name for Windows 95). I quickly grabbed 6 people and we went to work. Thomas Reardon licensed the NCSA Mosaic code base from Spyglass in December, and in early January we mapped out an 8-week development plan for “O’Hare” (theinternational gateway to the world for Chicago: our web browser would be the gateway to the World Wide Web for Windows 95).
The Rise of Internet Explorer
Netscape was the early winner in the “Browser Wars”. Netscape posted the first beta release of “Navigator” (coincidentally) a few days after I created the IE team, and Navigator quickly became the most popular web browser. We shipped three versions of IE in 22 months and I — along with many other team members — worked 80-100 hour weeks for 17 of those months.
Despite being pre-installed on every Windows 95 PC beginning in 8/1995, IE gained only a few percentage points of browser market share. But when we released IE 3.0 in 8/1996, it won all the (trade) press reviews, and its market share soared to over 30% within a year.
IE 3.0 was the first browser to implement CSS, and IE 4.0 (9/1997) was the first browser to implement Dynamic HMTL: the foundation of all interactive web pages still today.
In May 1998, the United States Department of Justice filed an anti-trust lawsuit against Microsoft, with the rising success of Internet Explorer as Exhibit #1 in its case. (If we had done a crummy job, Internet Explorer would never have gained significant market share, and the DOJ would have had to find some other pretext to sue Microsoft.)
In late 1998, IE became the most popular web browser in the world, and its market share hit a peak of 95% in 2004. Internet Explorer seemed unassailable.
The Fall of Internet Explorer
Firefox (2004) and Chrome (2008) launched, and IE started losing market share. By late 2012, Chrome had taken the crown as the most popular web browser. IE market share continued to decline, and Microsoft announced the new Edge browser (2015). By early 2020, Microsoft threw in the towel and announced they would use the Chromium Engine for Edge. Microsoft web browsing technology was officially dead.
John, Brad and I all realized that to compete on the web, not only did we have to have our own web browser, but we had to be on all the popular computers, too. So Brad hired a team of ex-Apple (Claris, actually) software engineers to build IE for the Macintosh, and first version was posted in April, 1996.
But when Steve Ballmer became CEO of Microsoft in 1999, his strategy was “Windows Windows Windows”. He decided to “play defense” and defend Windows and Office from the Internet. So the IE team was told to focus on Windows. The last version of IE for the Macintosh was release in 2003.
David Bank‘s 2001 book Breaking Windows: How Bill Gates Fumbled the Future of Microsoft explores the internal conflicts between what Banks called the “Windows Hawks” and the “Internet Doves” [though “Internet Bulls” would have been a better phrase]. Maples left Microsoft in 1995, and by 2000 the rest of us “Doves” — Paul, Brad, John, and me — had also left. Steve Ballmer was CEO, and he was defending Windows from the inexorable rise of the Internet.
When new hardware platforms arose — Apple released its iPhone in 2007 and iPad in 2010, and Google released Android in 2008 — Internet Explorer was unavailable. Which sealed it’s fate.
(I could write an entire post about Microsoft’s failure in the mobile operating system market. Google mostly copied the “Windows” strategy with Android: selling their mobile OS to all comers. But the short answer is: Steve Ballmer hamstrung the internal “mobile OS” team with too many constraints from Windows. And the Windows team surely didn’t want a homegrown OS — at $10 a license — to compete with Windows: what if PC manufacturers wanted to save >$100 per PC and ship the mobile OS instead of Windows? Shades of the internal IBM Mainframe vs. PC struggles a decade earlier.)
Want to Learn More?
- The Web is the Next Platform — my surprisingly accurate vision (5/1995) of how the Web would surpass Windows (3 months before the launch of Windows 95).
- The Agitator — Meet Ben Slivka, The Burr Under Microsoft’s Saddle As It Reaches For Internet Power — an excerpt from the 1999 Paul Andrews book How The Web Was Won.
- Internet History Podcast — Brian McCulloch interviewed me (11/2014) about IE for his podcast.
Case Study: Internet Explorer 1994-1997
Here is a brief slide presentation I put together for a talk to a class at Northwestern University on 4/15/1997: